34 ideas
| 2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
| 2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
| 2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
| 2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
| 21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
| 21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| 2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| 2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
| 2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| 2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
| 2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
| 2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
| 2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
| 2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| 2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
| 2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
| 2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
| 2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
| 2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| 2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
| 2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |