48 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |