Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Reference', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'The Same F'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

22153

Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

19485

Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers

19486

We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

12155

Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16362

An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood]

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic

19487

Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]