13 ideas
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |