Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explanation: the state of play', 'Sets, Aggregates and Numbers' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]