10 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
| 12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
| 16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |