Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explanation: the state of play', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Causal Theory of Names'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius]