64 ideas
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |