11 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
| 14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
| 14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |