Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'No Understanding without Explanation', 'Some Puzzles of Ground' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens]
We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens]
Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]