17 ideas
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |