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All the ideas for 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism', 'Principia Ethica' and 'Mental Content'

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28 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]