17 ideas
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |