26 ideas
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |