Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Without Immediate Justification', 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' and 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study''

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]