67 ideas
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 17833 | The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M] |
| 17834 | Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M] |
| 17837 | Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 17836 | The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |