19 ideas
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |