13 ideas
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |