43 ideas
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |