12 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
| 21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
| 21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |