Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Rationality of Science' and 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]