10 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
| 17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
| 17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
| 17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
| 17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |