Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Guide of the Perplexed', 'Definitions' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
2510 Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
2516 Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11223 Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
11215 Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225 A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
11227 The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11224 Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
11226 Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
11221 A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216 If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11218 Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
11220 Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
11222 The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
2521 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
2513 We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
2522 Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
2518 Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
20696 We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
19085 Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides]