51 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
20696 | We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides] |
19085 | Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides] |