Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Guide of the Perplexed', 'Words without Objects' and 'Aboutness'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides]