Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Guide of the Perplexed', 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides]