14 ideas
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |