52 ideas
| 19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
| 21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
| 19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
| 22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
| 21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
| 21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
| 19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
| 19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
| 19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
| 19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
| 19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
| 19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
| 19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
| 19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
| 19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
| 19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
| 19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
| 19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
| 19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
| 19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
| 21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
| 21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
| 20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
| 21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
| 22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
| 21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
| 21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |