Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Interpretation' and 'Rationality and Logic'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]