62 ideas
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |