12 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |