Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Identity and Essence' and 'The Nature of Existence vol.2'

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24 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]