Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
3756 Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3757 Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3759 You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3753 Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3755 Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3761 Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]