31 ideas
| 19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
| 19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
| 19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
| 19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
| 19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
| 19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
| 19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
| 19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
| 19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
| 19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |