16 ideas
22701 | Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
22703 | We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D] |
22702 | Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D] |
22696 | 'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D] |
22697 | Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D] |
22700 | Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D] |
22699 | Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D] |
22698 | We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |