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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Intermediate Logic' and 'The Republic'

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163 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato]
The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato]
For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock]
'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock]
'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock]
'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock]
The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock]
'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock]
'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock]
'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato]
A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock]
Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock]
Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock]
It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock]
Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock]
MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock]
|= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock]
If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock]
A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock]
Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock]
The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock]
Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock]
The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock]
Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock]
In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock]
Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock]
Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock]
A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock]
Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock]
In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock]
A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock]
Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock]
A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock]
If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock]
A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock]
A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock]
Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock]
Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock]
Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak]
There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato]
The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato]
Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato]
Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato]
Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato]
The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato]
For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C]
Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato]
Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato]
Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato]
Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato]
Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato]
Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato]
Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato]
To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato]