Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Causal Explanation' and 'Higher-Order Logic'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10301 The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10588 First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10298 Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro]
10299 If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
10300 Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10290 Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10590 Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro]
10296 The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro]
10297 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro]
10292 Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10294 Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10591 Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]