15 ideas
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |