Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'teachings', 'fragments/reports' and 'Foundations without Foundationalism'

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105 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro]
It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro]
Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro]
There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro]
Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro]
Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro]
The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro]
Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro]
The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine]
Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro]
In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro]
Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro]
Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro]
Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro]
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro]
Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro]
Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Nagarjuna and others pronounced the world of experience to be an illusion [Nagarjuna, by Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]