Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophy of Arithmetic' and 'Causation and Supervenience'

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17 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]