63 ideas
| 326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
| 315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
| 306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
| 20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
| 12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
| 307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
| 318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
| 321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
| 5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
| 330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
| 332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
| 328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
| 331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
| 311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
| 310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
| 325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
| 327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
| 314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
| 312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
| 309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
| 308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |