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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Will to Power (notebooks)' and 'Writing the Book of the World'

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132 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche]
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche]
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche]
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche]
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche]
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche]
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche]
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche]
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche]
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche]
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche]