Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'works' and 'The Human Condition'

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54 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]