332 ideas
| 78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
| 5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
| 2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| 103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
| 76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle] |
| 35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
| 27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
| 28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
| 95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
| 79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
| 5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
| 5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
| 5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
| 5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle] |
| 8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre] |
| 12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
| 4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle] |
| 20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski] |
| 4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
| 5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
| 4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| 72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
| 52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
| 5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
| 46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
| 5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
| 31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
| 5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
| 5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
| 5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
| 21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
| 88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle] |
| 91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle] |
| 71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle] |
| 34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
| 4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| 4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
| 54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
| 58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
| 4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
| 5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| 107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
| 5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
| 5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| 55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
| 5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
| 5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
| 5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
| 4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
| 5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| 5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
| 3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
| 5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
| 4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
| 4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
| 5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
| 56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
| 4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
| 5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
| 4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
| 4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| 5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
| 3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
| 4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
| 60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
| 61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
| 4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
| 5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
| 65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
| 5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
| 5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
| 5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
| 5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
| 5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
| 64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
| 4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
| 5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
| 5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
| 4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
| 5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
| 5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
| 5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
| 5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
| 4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
| 24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
| 110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
| 104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
| 18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
| 5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
| 18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
| 105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
| 111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
| 5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
| 38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
| 1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
| 108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
| 2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| 2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| 85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
| 5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
| 5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle] |
| 5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle] |
| 5133 | Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle] |
| 86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle] |
| 5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle] |
| 21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle] |
| 5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle] |
| 87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle] |
| 5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle] |
| 5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle] |
| 21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
| 21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
| 5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle] |
| 5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle] |
| 5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle] |
| 2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| 5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
| 24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle] |