Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' and 'Thinking About Logic'

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113 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]