104 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |