16 ideas
| 9271 | Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 9275 | Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray] |
| 9276 | The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 9278 | Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray] |
| 9280 | Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray] |
| 9272 | Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray] |
| 9279 | What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray] |