334 ideas
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |