Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Utilitarianism' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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34 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]