Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Ontological Dependence' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]